Fifty-five years after, Nigeria is still in a fix. Although military rule is now old-fashioned, the bewildered country is yet to fully recover from its devastating effects. The federal principle was liquidated, making Nigeria, an amalgam of incompatible and highly heterogeneous social formations, to slide into an avoidable unitarist enclave, barely six years after independence. Since then, the retracing of steps has been difficult.
So impactful negatively has the military legacy been that, 21 years after the restoration of civil rule, the country has not recovered from the dominant culture of over-centralisation of power, which has made the component units’ puppets existing at the financial whims and caprice of the power-loaded distant government.
The puzzle is: when will true federalism be restored?
As Nigerians reflect on the coups and counter-coups of January 15, 1966, they agonise over the misadventure of the military interlopers, whose main legacy was the abolition of power devolution. The national question stares the beleaguered nation-state in the face. Some leaders even manipulate the agitation for devolution on the borrowed platform of restructuring for partisan reasons.
But, to observers, the solution to the fundamental issue appears elusive, making the diverse stakeholders, many who have lost national outlook, to push for the renegotiation of the basis for national unity and peaceful co-existence. Others are advocating for a loose federation, and even, disintegration or secession, without much reflection.
As Nigeria still fails to grapple with its fundamental identity, participation and distribution crises, its leadership has not been able to rekindle confidence about the prospects of unity in diversity, the inherent advantage of big economic market and the utility and combined strengths of its numerical strength.
The genesis was the mutiny by soldiers, who were fed up with the activities of politicians who promoted ethnicity, religious division, corruption and general maladministration. But, having displaced the legitimate authorities, they proceeded to wreck monumental havoc on the polity by pursuing an agenda, which made the antics of the civilian leaders a child’s play.
Many commentators have argued that the civilian government emphasised centrifugal forces in the political system. The polity was just evolving under Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. The first six years of democracy were turbulent. Many errors were made by the antagonistic leaders from diverse regions.
But, the first military regime built on this faulty foundation by stressing the same centrifugal forces in the various political associations of the diverse people of Nigeria.
The conspirators, led by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, were bubbling with idealistic yearnings. They unmindful of the implications of their mission for the emerging federal country. Nzeogwu’s co-travelers were Chris Anuforo, Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Donatus Okafor and Wale Ademoyega. They marked down Balewa, the four premiers and some key ministers for elimination. Also, they planned to kill their superior officers, who were perceived as strong men capable of foiling the coup.
The mutineers succeeded in killing the Head of Government, the Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okoti-Eboh, the Premier of the Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and his Western counterpart, Chief Ladoke Akintola.
It appeared that the top civilian leaders were actually ignorant of where military control lay in constitutional reality; hence, they failed to avert the looming danger. The ceremonial President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, was abroad. The Premiers of the Midwestern and Eastern Regions, Denis Osadebey and Michael Okpara, also Igbos, were spared by the coup plotters. On that note, the North cried foul, saying that the plot had an ethnic colouration. As Balewa was being killed, he was said to have retorted in Hausa: “Ibo! Ibo! Ibo! Sai kun rasa wajen zama a Nijeriya (Igbo! You will lack any place to belong to in Nigeria).
The coup negated military professionalism. The coup plotters were motivated by similar coups in Egypt and Sudan, which brought down legitimate authorities. But, they exceeded their projections. They planned for killings. But, not all the targets were hit. The commission raised a serious ethnic question.
The coup also took its toll on the military. The casualties included Brigadier Zakari Maimalari of the Second Brigade, Col. Kur Mohammed, described by the British author, Trevor Clark, as an amiable, but self-indulgent Chief of Army Staff-designate, Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun of the First Brigade, Kaduna, who had alerted the Prime Minister to the impending doom, and Col. Ralph Sodeinde of the Training College, Kaduna.
Some authors have stated that Ironsi’s was also a target. But, he escaped, having left the wedding party organised by admirers for Maimalari and his wife for another one on the Elder Dempster Line Flagship, Aureol, at Apapa Wharf. It was also suggested that Col. Yakubu Gowon, who got the hint at the party, hurriedly left a night club. He gave the impression that he was heading for Ibadan, but later strategically diverted to Mushin, instead of returning to barracks. Nzeogwu’s friend, Olusegun Obasanjo, who had just returned to the country from abroad, was said to have been kept in the dark.
All the civilians and senior military leaders who lost their lives during the rebellion were not accorded ceremonial burial befitting men of honour. The new Ironsi government did not send any representative to their funeral ceremony.
Amid the conspiracy, the General Officer Commanding the Armed Forces, Major General Thomas Aguiyi-Ironsi, was on the sideline. But, he later emerged as the chief beneficiary of the mutiny, having capitalised on the gap in strategy by the mutineers.
What is the place of Ironsi in the history of Nigeria? He was a jolly good fellow; a good family man and a professional soldier. He made history as the first General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Armed Forces, after succeeding General Welby Everard, who was not keen about recommending him as a successor. His critics said he assumed political leadership without vision and plan. The circumstances of the time foisted the responsibility on his shoulders. Politically and administratively, his tenure was, uneventful. It was a period of strange experimentation when the command system in the military was replicated in public administration. Advocates of federalism believed that to the extent that he lacked the understanding of what can keep a highly heterogeneous society together, he was colossal failure. Also, to that extent, Ironsi, in their view, cannot be described as a giant of contemporary history.
In fact, his predecessor as GOC, a British General, had preferred Ademulegun, Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe and Maimalari as successor, despite the gallantry of Ironsi during the Congo Peace-Keeping Operations. Former Information Minister Ayo Rosiji told his biographer, Dr Nene Uba, that what paved the way for Ironsi’s ascension was the pressure on the Prime Minister by the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) ministers of Igbo origin, including Dr. Kingsley Mbadiwe and Mathew Mbu, to appoint him. Their argument was that juniors cannot be promoted above their seniors.
As the coup failed, the GOC seized the opportunity for military personality assertion. Many writers said he was an opportunist. It was evident, as a British commentator, Trevour Clark, put it, that the majority of the army would not join the rebels in a civil war between a Federal Government headed by the GOC and a murderous revolutionary government set up by a major in Kaduna.
Ironsi may have tricked the rebels to surrender. Already, there was a subsisting class war between him and these more educated rivals. The five majors were university graduates, unlike Ironsi, who felt that the civilian leaders foisted these young elite on him as junior officers. Nzeogwu, who was arrested and detained, protested in vain, saying: “We feel it is absurd that men who risked their lives to establish the new regime should be held prisoner by other soldiers.”
Ironsi also feigned loyalty to Balewa, whose whereabouts was known when he was seized by coup plotters. In that moment of anxiety, the cabinet was in disarray. A sort of succession struggle broke out between two ministers – Alhaji Bukar Dipcharima and Mbadiwe, and the Acting President, Dr. Nwafor Orizu, could not quickly name an Acting Prime Minister. The GOC cleverly conveyed the impression that the only route to stability and restoration of peace was to hand over the reins to him. Orizu had to later announce that he was advised by the Council of Ministers, led by Dipcharima, to voluntarily hand over to Ironsi to restore order and peace. The ministers surrendered under duress.
Ironsi may have lacked an advantage of political education and enlightenment. The newly designated Supreme Commander of the Federal Military Government made a public pronouncement of a seven-point programme. He decreed the suspension of the constitution and abolished the offices of the president, prime minister, governors, premiers and parliaments. He appointed military governors for the regions; Major Hassan Katsina (North), Lt. Col. Emeka Odimegwu-Ojukwu (East), Lt. Col. Adekunle Fajuyi (West) and Lt. Col. David Ejoor (Midwest). The deposed civilian governors were made advisers to them. Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe became Ironsi’s deputy at the Supreme headquarters. Gowon, who was to succeed him six months later, was appointed as Chief of Army Staff.
Ironsi became the head of a country in turmoil. Yet, it appeared that he lacked a clear direction. In his book titled: ‘People, politics and politicians of Nigeria (1940-1979),’ Bola Ige, the bitter Publicity Secretary of the proscribed Action Group (AG), wrote: “What Ironsi did was to, as our people would say, eat with all ten fingers. He blackmailed Orizu, Inuwa Wada, Dipcharima and other ministers with the “coup” of five majors, and he blackmailed Nzeogwu with his “mutinous group” and the “government” that the Acting President had “voluntarily handed over to me.”
Apparently, the Head of State may have also been carried away by the pleasure of office. As Ige, who later became the governor of Oyo State in the Second Republic, put it: “Ironsi successfully hijacked the putsch of the five majors and proceeded to install himself in office. He moved into the State House at Marina, Lagos, and began a flamboyant lifestyle. He himself loved the bottle and he was not niggardly in the distribution of alcohol in that royal palace.
“Before long, Nigerians began to see something they had not been used to seeing before; the wife of a head of Federal Government strutting about in expensive clothes and headgear under the guise of doing one charitable thing or other. And a crowd of boot-lickers and mis-advisers descended upon Ironsi from among his Igbo people.”
The new administration was confused about urgent challenges of governance. Students and activists persisted in their clamour for the release of Nzeogwu, the symbol of patriotic pan-Nigerian fervour. The West was disappointed that Ironsi was silent about the fate of the jailed leader of opposition, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, their idol, in prison. Delegations from the various provinces in Yorubaland protested to Fajuyi, saying that his continued imprisonment was unjust. The Head of State turned a deaf ear. The perception of the North and the West was that the new regime was to the advantage of the East, the home region of the ruler. In fact, while reflecting on that period of national anxiety, Gowon told his biographer: “There were complaints that only Igbos came to advise Ironsi.”
In May and June 1966, there were massacres in the North and many Easterners were victims. The pogrom had started. Northern vocal voices unleashed the calls for “Araba;” thinking that secession was the final solution. Even, Suleman Takuma, who later become a presidential adviser in the Second Republic, placed an article in the Federal Government-owned newspaper, calling for the break-up of Nigeria. He was merely echoing what federal legislators from the North had demanded 13 years earlier when they were booed at the Lagos Airport on their way home after rejecting the motion for independence.
Of course, Northern military officers suspected that Ironsi had hand in the coup, simply because it was largely perceived as an Ibo plot. Although the four military governors understood governance better, their efforts at calming down tensed nerves were not matched or complemented by any logical understanding of the grave challenges by the Supreme Commander. The military leader was in a precarious situation. Since Ironsi was reluctant to punish the executors of the coup that brought him to power, the Northern officers were angry, thinking that he had encouraged indiscipline and disloyalty. But, if he had wielded the big stick, Southerners who saw the coup as a revolutionary move would have also been offended.
Reflecting on Ironsi’s tenure, eminent scholar Prof. Isawa Elaigwu noted that, though the nature of the coup became more suspicious to many Nigerians, the Head of State’s subsequent actions only aggravated it. “In a way, it may be argued that General Ironsi was a victim of circumstances, which required the quick use of his mental capacity and political subtlety; two traits Ironsi did not possess in adequate amounts,” added the political scientist in his book: ‘Gowon: The biography of a soldier-statesman.’
Elaigwu suggested that the political pulls within the system may have made Ironsi to vacillate in making radical changes in the Federal-Regional relations.
The Nation